Nothing spells Freedom like a Hooters meal. A Reply to Professor Winter by Tinnevelt, R.B.J.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/106595
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-07-08 and may be subject to
change.
‘Nothing Spells Freedom Like a Hooters Meal’*
Ronald Tinnevelt
1 Introduction
Enlightenment universalism has a long and rich history. Although often associ-
ated with Kant’s motto ‘Have courage to make use of your own understanding!,’1
it can be seen as far more than that. Many portray the Enlightenment project as a
‘vastly ambitious program … of secularism, humanity, cosmopolitanism and free-
dom.’2 Described as such, it seems difficult to refute. Who doesn’t favour free-
dom, or the thought that all men are part of a single moral community? But
Enlightenment universalism does not lack critics. Opposition to its core ideas
– the counter-enlightenment – is, as Isaiah Berlin rightly remarks, ‘as old as the
movement itself.’3 Just think of the works of Johan Gottfried Herder, Edmund
Burke, Joseph de Maistre and Giambattista Vico.
Criticism of Enlightenment universalism has not faded away. Within contempo-
rary philosophy it is still alive and kicking. Many thinkers – from communitarian
critics (like Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre) to postmodernists (such as
Jean-François Lyotard and Jacques Derrida); from feminist theorists (like Iris
Marion Young and Susan Moller Okin) to agonistic pluralists (such as Chantal
Mouffe and Bonnie Honig) – have either rejected Enlightenment universalism
altogether or rebutted some of its core metaphysical illusions. Of these illusions,
there are two which are well-known: the idea of the subject as ‘disembedded and
disembodied,’ and the idea of having found ‘an Archimedean standpoint, situated
beyond historical and cultural contingency.’4 Sandel’s description of the Kantian
subject as an ‘unencumbered self’ – the self as ‘independent of its aims and
attachments’5 – nicely illustrates what a criticism of the first type of illusion
might look like. As to criticism of the second metaphysical illusion, Seyla Benha-
bib’s and Iris Marion Young’s democratic ideal of public debate and deliberation
between socially embedded citizens is influential.
* The first part of this title is a quote from Fox News commentator Brian Kilmeade, quoted by
Winter as an example of the ‘misidentification of consumer choice with freedom’ (Section 2).
I would like to thank Carel Smith, Derk Venema and two anonymous reviewers of this journal for
positive feedback on an earlier version of this paper.
1 Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. M.J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 17. Italics in original.
2 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, vol. 1 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), 3.
3 Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays, ed. H. Hardy & R. Hausheer
(New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1997), 243.
4 Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 4.
5 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, (Cambridge University Press, sec. ed., 1998),
xiv.
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Winter’s impressive critique of the conventional account of freedom and democ-
racy can be best understood against this background. One of his main claims,
after all, is that our current misunderstanding of freedom and self-governance is
primarily the result of the strict dichotomy between subject and object that we
have inherited from the Enlightenment tradition. Within such a dualist schema
the agent is seen as a socially disembedded self and freedom as a form of non-
interference. Instead, Winter develops a civic republican account of freedom and
democracy in which human beings are seen as fully socially situated and self-gov-
ernance is seen as a socially constructed and situated capacity.
Whether or not Winter’s critique of Enlightenment universalism is correct is a
question I cannot pursue here in any great depth. This would not only require a
reconstruction of the core ideas of the Enlightenment project – presupposing of
course that there is a clearly identifiable set of ideas that was shared by a wide
range of eighteenth-century thinkers6 – but also a systematic comparison with
the different points of criticism that Winter has developed throughout his other
works. Considering, furthermore, that Professor Winter’s criticism has many
points in common with the critique put forward by the contemporary philoso-
phers mentioned above (in addition I could have also mentioned Bellah’s Habits of
the Heart [1985] or Lasch’s The Culture of Narcissism [1978]) posing such a ques-
tion is not the most interesting or productive endeavour.7
Instead, this paper critically reconstructs Winter’s civic republican take on free-
dom and democratic self-governance. Its main aim is to show that Winter’s recon-
ceptualized notion of freedom and self-governance – although highly relevant and
thought-provoking – needs to be further clarified to form the basis of a truly per-
suasive and comprehensive theory of democracy. Some important questions are
not adequately addressed.
Section 2 will argue that Winter’s analysis of the idea of freedom-as-transcen-
dence leaves two important issues ‘relatively’ untouched: the precise details of his
anti-collectivist claim (2.1), and the necessary conditions for the possibility of a
moral point of view (2.2). As a consequence it is difficult not only to determine
how Winter can distinguish between freedom and lack of freedom, but also to
assess how limited or radical Winter’s critique of Enlightenment universalism
really is.
Section 3 deals with Winter’s civic republican account of democratic self-govern-
ance. Winter’s account, as will be argued, leaves three issues in large measure
6 James Schmidt, ‘What Enlightenment Project?,’ Political Theory 28 (6) (2000): 736.
7 There are, of course, also many interesting parallels between Winter’s analysis of the modern
notions of subjectivity and freedom and important philosophical ‘classics,’ like Marx’ critique of
Bruno Bauer in On The Jewish Question (1844), Macpherson’s notion of possessive individualism
in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (1962), and Marcuse’s critical account of techno-
logical rationality in One Dimensional Man (1964). Given these parallels a relevant question arises
which I shall not address in my paper: to what extent does Winter’s theory differ from the other
accounts already given?
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unaddressed: the common symbolic space of democratic communities (3.1), the
status of political participation (3.2), and the political institutions that are need-
ed to counter political apathy (3.3). Consequently, confusion arises as to which
version of civic republicanism Winter defends. Indeed, it is problematic to under-
stand how we can ‘reclaim the values of democracy and self-governance’ in a
world in which citizens have ‘internalized a passive ethic of spectatorship and
consumerism.’8
Sections 2 and 3 will not only draw on Winter’s paper in this issue but also on his
other papers on freedom and self-governance. Finally, section 4 contains some
concluding remarks. No systematic attempt, however, will be undertaken to
reduce the claims made in sections 2 and 3 to a single argument.
2 Freedom-as-Transcendence
A substantial part of Winter’s paper consists of a systematic critique of the mod-
ern notion of freedom-as-transcendence. Freedom – according to this notion – is
seen as ‘the absence or overcoming of constraint.’ (Section 0) Winter replaces this
modern story of freedom with an account in which freedom is seen as ‘a function
of social context.’ (Section 3) This section will argue that although Winter’s cri-
tique of freedom-as-transcendence is lucid and clear, his alternative notion of
freedom could gain in relevance and persuasiveness by means of a fuller contem-
plation of the following two issues.
2.1 Freedom and Lack of Freedom
Critics of Enlightenment universalism often follow the same argumentative pat-
tern. They begin by describing certain negative social, political or economic prac-
tices, and proceed to attempt to trace these back to the Enlightenment vision of
morality and politics.9 Winter’s critique of the conventional ideas of freedom and
democratic self-governance is no different.10 He begins his paper by pointing at
several ‘setbacks and breakdowns’ of two trends characteristic of our current era
of globalization: the spread of market economy and democracy. These setbacks
– like the coexistence in China of consumerism with political repression and
state-capitalism – are then linked to a ‘highly false and fetishistic concept of indi-
vidual freedom.’11 (Section 0) Winter also mentions two other deplorable devel-
opments within contemporary Western societies: consumer culture and political
8 Steven L. Winter, ‘When Self-Governance Is a Game,’ Brooklyn Law Review 67 (4) (2002): 1204-5.
9 Schmidt, ‘What Enlightenment Project?,’ 763.
10 Although he develops a more nuanced view in Steven L. Winter, ‘What Makes Modernity Late?,’
International Journal of Law in Context 1 (1) (2005): 61-80.
11 Steven L. Winter, ‘Down Freedom’s Main Line,’ in this issue. All further citations of this article
are included directly in the main body of the text.
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apathy. Both developments are seen as the result of a specific conception of the
individual – the individual as rational and self-directing.12
The effects of this conception are pervasive, penetrating a broad range of spheres
of life: from economics and politics, to science and religion.13 The modern con-
cept of the individual ‘organizes and distorts’ these spheres. Within economics,
for example, this conception translates into the idea that human beings will try to
rationally maximize their self-interest while avoiding unnecessary short-term
risks. The financial crisis of 2008, however, has shown that this model of rational
agents did not lead to efficient and reliable markets. Banks were more than will-
ing to provide risky loans and future homeowners to take out these questionable
mortgages. Within politics, the notion of self-directing agents takes the form of
self-governance. Citizens want to determine the fate of their society and the way
in which it is organized. As a result of the underlying concept of the individual,
however, the political sphere has become increasingly passive and is being under-
cut by a growing dichotomy between the ideas of state and individual. Citizens
behave like passive consumers and see policies and laws as a violation of their
right to choose their own way of life.
The driving force behind this modern conception of the individual is the ‘dualist
schema of subject and object’ that we inherited from the Enlightenment.
Although this schema has made modern science and economic progress possible,
it comes with a clear downside. The subject, according to Winter, is not only isola-
ted from ‘the objects of its inquiry,’ but also from its own history and other sub-
jects. Subject and social context are forced apart, the latter being reduced to an
‘external condition’ and a mere ‘source of constraint.’ (Section 2)
Thomas Hobbes’ view of freedom in Leviathan (1651) is often mentioned in this
regard. ‘A free-man,’ according to Hobbes, is ‘he, that in those things, which by
his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to
do.’14 The core of this definition is the idea of non-interference, of not being hin-
dered by others or the state.15 Freedom, as a consequence, is seen as self-depend-
ence and will result in ‘atomism, alienation, and social fragmentation.’ (Section 0)
Winter strongly opposes this idea of freedom as non-interference. Instead he
opts, as already mentioned above, for ‘freedom as a function of social context.’
According to this notion, freedom ‘requires others.’ In this sense, freedom is a
12 The effects of these processes are, of course, more complex than I sketch here. As one of the
anonymous reviewers of this journal rightly remarked, political apathy and the consumer culture
can also be explained in terms of the internalization of the idea of the individual as rational and
self-directing. Not only has this idea had a tremendous effect on the way in which liberal society
has been organized in the past, but it has also been internalized and consequently vehemently
‘supported’ by individuals themselves.
13 Below we will follow Steven L. Winter, ‘Reimagining Democracy for Social Individuals,’ Zygon:
International Journal of Religion and Science 46 (1) (2011): 225-26.
14 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 [1651]),
146.
15 Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 7.
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‘necessarily shared, socially situated capacity.’ (Section 0) Although I agree with
Winter in this regard, his paper does not adequately explain how such a notion of
freedom can help us to distinguish between freedom and lack of freedom or
between ‘free and unfree actions.’ (Section 0) Let us go back to Hobbes’ work to
further clarify this claim.
‘Let us consider men,’ Hobbes writes in Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Gov-
ernment and Society (1651), ‘as if but even now spring out of the earth, and sud-
denly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement to
each other.’16 Although this quote should primarily be seen against the back-
ground of Hobbes’ reflection on the hypothetical state of nature, it nonetheless
exemplifies the first metaphysical illusion that I mentioned above. The modern
individual is seen as a ‘disembedded and disembodied’ self. This metaphysical illu-
sion of Enlightenment universalism is the main object of Winter’s analysis when
he deals with the conventional notion of freedom.
Winter defends an anti-atomist position in this regard. It is anti-atomist because
it insists that ‘the notion of the solitary individual is essential bogus.’17 People
fundamentally depend on each other and are social creatures:
‘We are each of us the products of particular forms of life and possessed of
and by particular perspectives. When, as a citizen, I adopt a policy position on
some important issue of the day, I come to that decision already constituted
by the social practices and conditions, historical traditions, and cultural
understandings that make me who I am.’ (Section 1)
Atomism stands opposed to holism. Unlike atomists, holists argue that distinc-
tive human capacities (like the ability to reason) cannot be developed by solitary
individuals. Social relations are necessary to properly enjoy those capacities. Win-
ter’s anti-atomist critique seems rather straightforward. The social is not some-
thing that the self can simply ‘choose to reject or affirm as her own.’18
If the self is thoroughly socially constructed, however, an important problem
appears on the horizon. To what extent can Winter adequately solve the individu-
alist difficulty that he mentions in his paper? Is Winter’s socially situated self
really capable of self-governance? His anti-atomist claim merely explains that the
agent of self-governance cannot be the ‘autonomous self of pure will’19 or the
Kantian transcendental subject. But it does not show the socially constructed self
to be really capable of self-governance.
16 Thomas Hobbes, ‘Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society,’ in The English
Works of Hobbes, ed. W. Molesworth (London: John Bohn, 1839), 109.
17 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997), vii. For the distinction between anti-atomism and anti-collectivism we draw on Pet-
tit’s work.
18 Winter, ‘Reimagining Democracy,’ 237.
19 Ibid., 234.
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At this point the distinction between individualism and collectivism comes into
play. Theories are anti-collectivist when they reject ‘the idea that individuals are
the playthings of aggregate social forces.’20 Contrary to the atomism-holism dis-
tinction, the individualism-collectivism distinction does not deal with the hori-
zontal relation between people but with the vertical one. It focuses on the ques-
tion of whether individual autonomy is compromised by social forces.21
From his paper it is clear that Winter defends an anti-collectivist claim. He never
argues that ‘personal self-governance is illusory’ (Section 4), nor does he deny
that we can ‘distinguish between more or less autonomous modes of being.’22 The
main difficulty with his analysis, however, is that it insufficiently clarifies how
such a distinction between freedom and lack of freedom can be made. What
makes socially constituted selves autonomous? And in what precise way are ‘per-
sonal and collective self-governance … mutually constitutive and reinforcing’?
(Section 4) The examples of the torture chamber and the demonstrations on Tah-
rir Square are not very helpful in this regard.
Due to this lack of clarification, his theory constructs a fragile balance between
embracing and dismissing a form of post-Enlightenment universalism: some-
times swinging to the left, sometimes to the right. The following remark illus-
trates this ambiguity:
‘the conceptual vocabulary of democracy depends on concepts of the self,
agency, and autonomy made problematic – if not, indeed, obsolete – by disci-
plines ranging from psychoanalysis through post-structuralism and contem-
porary cognitive science.’23
Less ambiguous, but also illustrative of the difficulty of retaining a meaningful
form of agency and autonomy, is what Winter says about sexual autonomy in par-
ticular and autonomy generally: ‘Sexual autonomy … can only be exercised within
an interdependent, highly constrained, and already constructed world.’24
I am not claiming that the notion of a situated self is incompatible with ideas
such as agency and autonomy. Theorists such as Seyla Benhabib and Charles Tay-
lor, for example, have clearly shown that this need not be the case. I am merely
arguing that more needs to be said regarding the specifics of individual autonomy
and the anti-collectivist claim.
Arguing that autonomy can only be nourished by ‘attending to the interactions
between a situated individual and some larger, interdependent set of social rela-
20 Pettit, Republicanism, vii.
21 Philip Pettit, ‘Analytical Philosophy,’ in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, vol. 2.
Second edition, ed. R.E. Goodin, P. Pettit, & T. Pogge (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2012),
26.
22 Winter, ‘Reimagining Democracy,’ 231.
23 Ibid., 230. Italics are not in the original.
24 Ibid., 238.
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tions,’25 doesn’t yet explain how autonomy can be exercised or how we can ‘dis-
tinguish between more or less autonomous modes of being.’ Or put differently,
claiming that freedom-as-transcendence is ‘unattainable’ (Section 1) still leaves
open the question whether reason can have transcending elements. Some form of
transcendence, as Marcuse rightly claimed, is necessary to counteract the con-
sumer culture in advanced industrial civilization.26
2.2 Post-Enlightenment Universalism?
Our main argument in the last section was that Winter’s analysis needs further
clarification in order to be properly capable of distinguishing between different
degrees of freedom. In this section we will focus on the question whether Winter
embraces or dismisses any form of post-Enlightenment universalism. Does Win-
ter completely abandon the universalist presuppositions of the Enlightenment
project, or does he still stick to a stripped down version of Enlightenment univer-
salism?
Of these two alternatives, only the first seems difficult to square with Winter’s
defence of political agency and deliberative discourse. Although Winter strongly
relies on the postmodern critique of subjectivity, he is neither a postmodernist
nor a relativist. Democratic self-governance, according to Winter, requires ‘a
reflective, inclusive public discourse’27 that is based ‘on communicative relations
of equality, solidarity, and mutual recognition.’ (Section 0) What is more, Winter
does not argue that ‘modern subjectivity lacks moral value.’ (Section 2)
But if Winter really opts for a post-Enlightenment form of universalism an
important question immediately arises that is not adequately dealt with in his
paper: whether some form of a ‘universalistic’ moral point of view is still possible.
Let us return to the second metaphysical illusion that was mentioned in the
introduction to further clarify this claim. This illusion refers to the fact that many
Enlightenment universalists claim to have found an Archimedean moral stand-
point that is situated beyond the historical and cultural contingencies of contem-
porary society (a ‘view from nowhere’ to use Nagel’s expression). Examples that
are often mentioned in this regard – rightly or wrongly – are Rawls’ original posi-
tion and Habermas’ ideal speech situation.
Where does Winter’s civic republican theory stand regarding this second illusion?
Given his scepticism of the ‘Enlightenment’s dualist schema of subject and object’
and his anti-atomist claim, we can infer that he is critical of the idea of an Archi-
medean standpoint. This is also confirmed by Winter’s view on self-reflection:
‘Just as I eye myself in the mirror with all the subjectivity of my already
extant self-image – which depending on who I am may be unrealistically self-
25 Ibid., 235.
26 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, Sec-
ond edition (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1991 [1964]), 13.
27 Steven L. Winter, ‘Citizens Disunited,’ Georgia State University Law Review 27 (4) (2010): 1140.
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flattering or witheringly self-critical – the process of self-reflection cannot be
innocent, untainted, or (in the Kantian sense) autonomous.’ (Section 1)
Both self and reason are socially situated and socially constructed. The fact, how-
ever, that reason cannot be fully self-transparent or self-grounding, doesn’t imply
that we need to drop the possibility of developing a universalist moral theory that
specifies an impartial or moral point of view. There is no need to abandon, in
other words, the epistemological perspective of Enlightenment universalism.28
Moral discourses can still lead to some form of universalizable content.
Seyla Benhabib, for example, effectively distinguishes two important steps in the
formulation of a post-metaphysical universalist position – i.e., an Enlightenment
universalist position freed from its metaphysical illusions. The first step is the
shift from a substitutionalist to an interactive and communicative form of uni-
versalism. The second step is recognizing the fact that the subjects of reason are
socially situated and socially dependent selves. They are ‘finite, embodied and
fragile creatures, and not disembodied cogitos or abstract unities of transcenden-
tal apperception.’29
Interactive universalist moral theories defend the importance of discursive legiti-
mation but take ‘difference as a starting point for reflection and action.’30 As a
consequence universality is seen as
‘a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied and embedded identity,
but aims at developing moral attitudes and encouraging political transforma-
tions that can yield a point of view acceptable to all. Universality is not the
ideal consensus of fictitiously defined selves, but the concrete process in poli-
tics and morals of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for
autonomy.’31
Interactive universalism, in that sense, incorporates Winter’s critique of Michel-
man’s theory of discursive legitimation. ‘The “self” that steps outside itself’ is pre-
cisely ‘the very same situated self.’ (Section 1) Whether Winter would accept this
reformulation of Michelman’s theory of discursive legitimation, however, is diffi-
cult to determine.
Winter also distinguishes two complementary moves when he deals with the
question of how to maintain some form of agency and autonomy despite the real-
ization that freedom-as-transcendence is both impossible and empty. Although
these two moves closely resemble Benhabib’s, there is an important difference.
The first move is to reconceptualize freedom as ‘a function of social context.’ (Sec-
tion 3) Freedom in this sense is the ‘situated capacity to transform – rather than
28 Benhabib, Situating the Self, 4.
29 Ibid., 5.
30 Ibid., 153.
31 Ibid.
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transcend – the conditions in which we live.’ (Section 3) The second step, as far as
I can see, is to add the ‘normative claim that freedom requires and depends on
relations of commitment, solidarity, and mutual recognition.’ (Section 3)
These two moves, however, fail to solve a number of problems. First, the problem
of how to ‘distinguish between more or less autonomous modes of being’ (see sec-
tion 2.1). Secondly, they do not say much about the construction of a moral point
of view, nor thirdly whether a defence of universalist moral theory is still possi-
ble. Winter could, of course, reply that he is not really opting for a form of post-
Enlightenment universalism. But this claim does not fit well with the core of his
paper. Winter, as I argued before, is neither a postmodernist nor a relativist. This
also follows directly from his critique of Robert Pippins’ attempt to unite situated
reason with ‘a Kantian understanding of autonomy as self-legislation.’ (Section 2)
A Hegelian project can be defended, but not ‘on anything like Hegel’s own terms.’
(Section 2)
3 A Civic Republican Account of Self-Governance
What about the second main notion of Winter’s analysis: the idea of collective
self-governance? Self-governance, according to Winter, ‘is only possible through
collective action.’ (Section 4) Like freedom, it is a socially constituted and socially
constructed capacity. Self-governance is ‘not a matter of self-legislation but of
effective social action that depends on cooperation and coordination.’ (Section 4)
Although this notion of self-governance looks convincing at first sight, this sec-
tion will argue that three essential elements of Winter’s account of civic republi-
can self-governance could be more adequately dealt with.
3.1 What Holds Political Societies Together?
Civic republicanism is a very broad church that includes different theoretical posi-
tions, such as radical democracy or communitarianism. Philip Pettit, for example,
clearly distinguishes his republican theory of non-domination from the populist
tradition of republicanism. The latter form of republicanism – labelled civic
republicanism – conceives of ‘democratic participation as one of the highest
forms of good’ and longingly recalls the idea of close, homogeneous societies.32
State representatives, in such a model, are only needed when no other options are
available.
Chantal Mouffe, a strong proponent of the radical democratic or radical pluralis-
tic version of civic republicanism, gives a similar critique of the communitarian
version: ‘It is not a question of moving from a “unitary unencumbered self” to a
“unitary situated self,” the problem is with the very idea of a unitary subject.’33
We have to accept the fact that modern societies are radical pluralist in character.
32 Pettit, Republicanism, 8.
33 Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (New York: Verso, 1993), 20.
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Human beings are always ‘multiple and contradictory subjects, inhabitants of a
diversity of communities.’34
So where does Winter’s analysis stand within this broad church? His recent work
on freedom and democracy does not present us with a ready-made answer.
Although Winter would probably argue against a utopian form of communitarian-
ism – like Sandel’s version of civic republicanism – there is no explicit reference to
this issue in his recent work. The only reference that I was able to find is located
in an article from the eighties. There Winter defends a perspective on transcen-
dent individualism that does not fully coincide with the position he defends in his
paper on this issue.35 In his paper from the eighties, however, Winter does claim
that
‘a utopian communitarianism might recreate the problem of collectivism that
individualism purported to solve. It might allow the whole (read: govern-
ment) to do things to the part (i.e., the individual) in the name of the greater
good. This critique, however, misconstrues the communal enterprise that I
am advocating. I do not argue that we should discard individualism, nor that
we should abandon the salutary notion of constitutional rights.’36
From this we can gather that Winter – unlike Sandel or MacIntyre – will not reject
liberal pluralism. Whereas Sandel and MacIntyre tend to combine anti-atomism
with a limited form of collectivism, Winter defends both anti-atomism and anti-
collectivism. Given the many footnotes to Charles Taylor’s work, it is more likely
that Winter’s theory of freedom and self-governance is closer to the civic republi-
can position of Taylor (and Michael Walzer). The fact that Winter sees Mouffe’s
agonistic pluralism as ‘an important complement to contemporary republican-
ism’37 also testifies to this conclusion. Taylor’s and Walzer’s revival of the civic
republican tradition, according to Mouffe, is very close to radical democracy.38
The fact that it is not immediately clear which version of civic republicanism Win-
ter defends, however, further complicates his solution to the institutional difficulty
– how collective autonomy can be reconciled with modern conditions of disagree-
ment and pluralism (Section 1) – and shows that his reinterpretation of demo-
cratic governance needs further refinement.
The dominant strategy for solving the institutional difficulty, according to Win-
ter, is one of discursive legitimation. The ‘gap between self-sovereignty and
majority rule’ is bridged by positing ‘conditions of participation sufficiently fair
34 Ibid., 34.
35 I have to admit, of course, that I haven’t read all of Winter’s work. I limit my analysis to his work
on freedom and self-governance.
36 Steven L. Winter, ‘The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance,’ Stanford Law
Review 40 (6) (1988): 1514.
37 Steven L. Winter, Democracy Ten Years After 9/11 (2011), 1140n, <http://law.wayne.edu/pdf/
democracy_ten_years_after.pdf>.
38 Mouffe, Return of the Political, 19.
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and inclusive to persuade the minority nevertheless to identify with the result as
their own.’ (Section 1) This route, however, is untenable due to the fact that it
depends on the questionable modern interpretation of self, agency, and
autonomy.
The only way in which the institutional difficulty can be solved, in Winter’s opin-
ion, is on the basis of two claims: to acknowledge the fact that the self of self-
governance is a socially constituted self, and to reinterpret self-governance as the
shared and collective ‘ability to exercise initiative with respect to one’s fate.’ (Sec-
tion 4) Although Mouffe would agree with the first claim, her agonist notion of
politics does not necessarily square well with the second. Characteristic of the
domain of the political, according to her, is a clear-cut distinction between friend/
enemy. There can be no politics without competing collective identities, without a
differentiation between we/they. This contrast constitutes its ‘condition of possi-
bility.’39
But what Mouffe, in contrast to Winter, does recognize, is that the institutional
difficulty can only be solved on the basis of a minimal political consensus among
citizens. Although she doesn’t deny that the we/they distinction could become
the ‘locus of an antagonism,’ she stresses the importance of a ‘common symbolic
space’ within which the conflict between ‘we’ and ‘they’ takes place.40 Within this
space the conflicting parties recognize each other’s legitimacy. If Winter, how-
ever, both rejects a utopian form of communitarianism (because of the problem
of collectivism) and a discursive form of legitimacy (because of the modern con-
ception of the individual on which it is based), he needs to add a third claim to the
two mentioned above: an analysis of what this ‘common symbolic space’ might
look like.
Take the major demonstrations at the Tahrir Square in Cairo. Winter is right in
arguing that these demonstrations clearly show the potential of an emancipatory
politics that is based on ‘relations of mutual recognition and solidarity.’ (Sec-
tion 3) However, what these protests also show is that feelings of belonging and
unity are often short-lived. The transformation in gender relations that Winter
mentioned, as he himself also recognizes, were of short-duration. Sexual harass-
ment quickly returned in daily life. But if the political is inherently defined by
conflict, we need some form of consensus to prevent agonistic relations from
becoming antagonistic.
3.2 Political Apathy and Political Participation
In his paper Winter gives a rather broad definition of democracy. Democracy is
seen as ‘the sharing of authority with others under conditions of mutual recogni-
tion and respect.’ (Section 0) The crucial question is, of course, what this ‘sharing
of authority’ precisely entails. Given his appreciation of Machiavelli’s republi-
can(ist) views, one might expect Winter to defend a contestatory form of democ-
39 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005), 16.
40 Ibid., 16, 20.
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racy. Within such a model of democracy political authority is primarily seen as a
form of control and contestation. The people should not only be able to actively
control the powers of government, by means of ‘electoral arrangements whereby
issues are decided by plebiscite or representatives who are chosen to decide
them,’ but also be able to scrutinize government laws and policies and ‘weed out
those that do not answer to common, recognizable interests.’41
Despite his appreciation of Machiavelli’s republicanism, the emphasis of Winter’s
civic republican theory is not on constitutional restraints, checks and balances, or
contestation. Instead he strongly stresses the importance of ‘equal participation
in determining the terms and conditions of social life.’ (Section 0) Self-gover-
nance is mainly a ‘function of contribution and not control’:
‘The democratic ideal designated by isonomia is not one that promises to each
individual actual … authorship of the laws. Rather, it promises the dignity of
equal participation in governance under terms of mutual recognition and
respect.’ (Section 4)
But what are we left with if political participation is not primarily seen as a vehi-
cle for control and contestation? At this point there is a strange leap in Winter’s
argument. Although highly critical of Michelman’s theory of discursive legitima-
tion (see above), Winter seems to opt for a model of democracy that precisely
embraces the idea of discursive legitimation as its core: the theory of deliberative
democracy.
According to deliberative democrats, political opinion and will-formation should
be conducted on the basis of a public exchange of reasonable arguments under
the rather general conditions of freedom, equality and inclusiveness. Winter’s
wording of democratic self-governance fits perfectly within such a model of
democracy. Democratic self-governance, according to Winter, is constituted by
deliberative discourse – ‘a reflective, inclusive public discourse that respects dif-
ferences and promotes responsibility and solidarity.’42 Democracy, in other
words, is based on public and inclusive deliberation among citizens.43 The impor-
tance of communicative relations furthermore, also seems to form the core of his
notion of freedom: ‘freedom requires others – that is, dependence – and is made
possible by communicative relations of equality, solidarity, and mutual recogni-
tion.’ (Section 0) At this point Winter’s analysis needs to be further clarified. Can
discursive legitimation be simultaneously repudiated and embraced? Can Winter
really have his cake and eat it too?
41 Philip Pettit, ‘Legitimate International Institutions: A Neorepublican Perspective,’ in The Philoso-
phy of International Law, ed. Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009), 145; idem, ‘Democracy, Electoral and Contestatory,’ Nomos 42 (1) (2000): 114-15.
42 Winter, ‘Citizens Disunited,’ 1140.
43 Winter, ‘What Makes Modernity Late?,’ 78.
274 Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 2012 (41) 3
Dit artikel van BJu Tijdschriften is gemaakt voor Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 59665+65441
‘Nothing Spells Freedom Like a Hooters Meal’
But there is also a second strange leap in Winter’s analysis of democratic self-gov-
ernance and political participation. In criticizing the ‘passive ethic of spectator-
ship and consumerism’ Winter makes the following claim: ‘Instead of looking to
politics and the public sphere for fulfilment, we are prompted to find meaning in
our lives through consumption and other forms of personal gratification.’44 But if
democratic participation is seen as a form of fulfilment, are we then to conclude
that Winter defends a participatory form of democracy in addition to a delibera-
tive theory?
Although this seems a rather insignificant shift at first sight, an important prob-
lem does crop up. Even though similar in many regards, deliberative and partici-
patory democrats strongly oppose their respective point of views of political par-
ticipation. Deliberative democrats, after all, will never argue that participation
should be seen as a form of fulfilment or as ‘one of the highest forms of good.’
They are, in fact, highly critical of such a view of political participation. And prob-
ably rightly so, as both views of political participation pull in different directions.
Winter’s analysis, therefore, also needs to be further clarified regarding this issue.
Can political participation simultaneously be seen as a vehicle for deliberative dis-
course (and of course also public autonomy) and as a form of fulfilment?
3.3 How to Encourage Political Participation?
Regardless of the specific status that is attached to political participation, two
questions still remain to be dealt with if Professor Winter wants to defend a com-
prehensive civic republican theory of democracy: (1) which skills and virtues are
needed to sustain democratic governance and (2) how can political participation
and public-spiritedness be encouraged among citizens who are politically disinter-
ested or even apathetic?45 Winter only answers the first question in detail. Demo-
cratic self-governance demands such skills as ‘empathy, negotiation, compromise,
cooperation, recognition of and respect for the other.’ (Section 2) In addition, citi-
zens must ‘insist on public control of the institutions of public power’ (Section 4)
and ‘place the common good before his or her own.’ (Section 4)
What about the second question? How can political participation be encouraged
and what kind of political institutions are best suited to counter political apathy
among citizens? Winter raises this question in several of his articles. And given
his civic republican account of freedom – which entails ‘an active, social dimen-
sion’ (Section 4) – there is no way around this question. Democratic self-govern-
ment is not something that can be taken for granted. It should be seen as a prac-
tice that needs to be reified and cultivated.
44 Ibid., 71. Italics added.
45 Although these questions, of course, gain in relevance if Winter is defending a participatory view
of democracy instead of a deliberative one.
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This second question is, of course, extremely difficult to answer. Political apathy,
according to many, has been deeply rooted in contemporary Western societies.46
One cannot expect Professor Winter to present us with a fully worked out theory
in this regard. Nevertheless, readers would greatly appreciate some general guide-
lines regarding this topic. Addressing questions of participation and representa-
tion, moreover, is essential if Winter wants to present us with a convincing
account of democratic self-governance. Without a more elaborate account of rep-
resentation and participation, after all, it remains extremely difficult to see how
‘freedom as a function of social context’ can lead to a political constellation in
which citizens are actually free to partake in processes of collective self-gover-
nance. To instigate such a response I end this paper by taking a quick glance at
Richard Dagger’s theory of civic republicanism.
Although I do not necessarily agree with Dagger, his position is fruitful to start
with. Dagger, after all, defends a version of liberal republicanism that closely
resembles Winter’s theory in many important aspects. Both theorists argue
against excessive individualism, emphasize social embeddedness, and try to incor-
porate a form of holist individualism. Holist individualism, as is well-known, is ‘a
trend of thought that is fully aware of the (ontological) social embedding of
human agents, but at the same time prizes liberty and individual differences
highly.’47
Dagger examines two strategies for overcoming political apathy. The first – a
form of instant direct democracy based on ‘electronic voting devices in the homes
of all citizens’48 is inconsistent with liberal republicanism. The second strategy
– adding compulsory voting and compulsory self-registration for voters to the
current system of representative government – is not. Supplementary to these
two changes in the voting system, Dagger also embraces attempts to establish
and support local political forums and deliberative opinion polling. The specifics
of these two strategies are not really relevant to our case. The main reasons for
embracing the second and condemning the first are.
Dagger’s argument against instant direct democracy is not that citizens are not
willing to participate in such a system. Rather he rejects it on the basis that it
doesn’t ‘instill a heightened sense of responsibility in the citizen’ and because
some ‘form of representation is necessary … if questions are to be formulated
properly and inconsistent demands are to be reconciled.’49 This last point of
course, raises the very interesting question to what extent political representa-
tion should be seen as an integral part of democratic participation.
46 An interesting question is of course whether Winter is right to be so pessimistic regarding the
political behaviour of citizens. I cannot, however, address this question here.
47 Charles Taylor, ‘Cross-Purposes,’ in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. N. Rosenblum (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 163. See also Charles Taylor, Hegel and the Modern Society
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 155-57.
48 Richard Dagger, Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 136.
49 Dagger, Civic Virtues, 141, 143.
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Dagger’s argument for compulsory voting and compulsory self-registration is a
rather pragmatic one. Although compulsory voting and compulsory self-registra-
tion merely treat the symptoms and not the disease of political apathy itself, they
force citizens to consider the importance of political participation and give them
a forum to express their social and political discontents. Voting, in that sense, ‘is
a step toward other, more demanding forms of political participation.’50
I want to end this section by posing two general questions: (1) to what extent can
these two strategies for overcoming political apathy complement Winter’s civic
republican theory of freedom and self-governance?, and (2) could Winter agree
with Dagger’s arguments against the first strategy? One of the reasons for asking
this last question is because both deliberative and participatory democrats have a
tough time incorporating the idea of representation in their models of democ-
racy. A more important reason, however, deals with the pillars on which Winter’s
civic republican theory of self-governance is build. As long as questions related to
representation and participation are not adequately solved, the basis of Winter’s
theory will have all the characteristics of quicksand.
4 Concluding Remarks
To what extent is a post-Enlightenment defence of universalism still possible in a
world in which both human beings and reason are socially embedded and socially
constituted? And how can we inspire political participation if many ‘prefer to play
the part of the citizen-consumer?’51 These were two of the guiding questions for
my discussion of Professor Winter’s account of freedom and self-governance.
Considering that I agree with many of Winter’s claims, this paper does not
present a full-blown critique of his arguments, but merely the posing of some crit-
ical questions for further clarification. Some of these questions are based on the
presumption that Winter still defends a version of post-Enlightenment universal-
ism, others are not. So even assuming that I misinterpreted the consequences of
Winter’s critique of the ‘Enlightenment’s dualist schema of subject and object’
– i.e., that he does not want to retain a version of the epistemological perspective
of Enlightenment universalism – some important questions will still remain.
Given, however, that Winter in different papers repeatedly argues that ‘communi-
cative relations of equality, solidarity, and mutual recognition’ are an important
aspect of and maybe even necessary condition for democratic self-governance,
defending a relativist position seems rather inconsistent. Does it really make
sense, after all, to defend a relativist position (perhaps one similar to that of
Richard Rorty) and – at the same time – argue that some concepts of individual
freedom and democracy are false?
50 Ibid., 150.
51 Ibid., 132.
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